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536 PEOPLE t'. MORTO~ [410.2<1 
[Crim. No. 5503. In Bunk. Sept. 25, 1953.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. LEON OLIFTON MORTON, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Habitual Ofienders-Evidence.-To warrant an 
adjudication that defendant is an habitual criminal the People 
must prove alleged prior convictions beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and if convictions were suffered in other states for 
offenses that go by different names from those in California, 
the People must prove that minimum elements of foreign 
ofiense are substantially similar to minimum elements of one 
of offenses enumerated in Pen. Code, § 644(a). 
[2] ld.-Habitual OfI:m:!ers-Evidence.-In proving a prior con-
viction, a fingerprint record card certifi:!d to be from files of 
Tennessee State Penitentiary showing defendr.nt's imprison-
ment is admissible under Pen. Code, § 96gb, declaring that 
prima facie evidence of prior cOllvictions and imprisonment 
can be established by "the records or copies of records of any 
state penitentiary ... in which such person has been im-
prisoned, when such records or copies thereof have been 
certified by the official custodian of such records." 
[8] ld.-Habitual Ofienders-E7idence.-A certified fingerprint 
record card from Tennessee State Penitentiary merely showing 
an entry that defendant was convicted of offense indicated 
by initials "HBL" does not constitute evidence that he was 
convicted in that state of felony of housebreaking and larceny, 
where these initials are not explained by Tennessee authorities, 
where the People rely on testimony of sergeant of local sheriff's 
office who admitted that he did not know element of offensp. 
or offenses designated by those initials as defined in Tennessee 
law and whose testimony merely showed that "as near as my 
memory stands" in a bulletin of Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion the initials "liB" stand for housebreaking and initial 
"L" for larceny, where there is no evidence that this system 
of ab!Jreviation is in ase in Tennessee State Penitentiary, and 
where there is nothing to indicate that initials stand for a 
single offense rather than two or three separate offenses. 
[4] ld.-Habitual OfienderS:-Evidence.-If information contained 
'in records of foreign penal institution in which defendant was' 
[lJ See Cal.JUl". lO-Yr.Supp. (1943 Rev.), Criminal Law, § 614a 
et seq.; Am.Jur., Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders, 
§ 10 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,4] Criminal Law, § 1466; [2] Crimiaal 
Law, § 1465; [3] Criminal Law, § 1461; [5-7,9,10, 11] Criminal 
Law, § 1468.5; [8] Criminal Law, § 1459. 
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impris()ned d()es D()t m~ke clear nature ()f his <>fIense, it is 
n()t unreas()nabJe W require the Pe()pJe w ascertain particular 
statute that defendant vi()lated, ()r W ()btain certified C()py ()f 
judgment ()f c()nvicti()n f()r purp()se of pr()ving elements of 
offense in questi()n. . 
[6] Id.-Habitual 01t·enders---Appeal-DetermiDati()n.~Where evi-
dence is insufficient t() supp()rt finding ()f trial C()urt that de-
fendantsufferei alleged pri()r oonvieti()n, but the error found 
is oonfined t() the prior c()nvicti()n charge, it is not neces~ary 
f()r the eourt OD appeal to require a Dew trial ()n all issues 
of case. 
[8] Id.-Habitual 01fenders - Appeal - DetermiDati()n.-Legisla-
tive purpMe expressed in 1931 amendment of Pen. Code, 
§ 969a, was to fh a time Ilfter which n() further charges ()f 
prior conviction could be made: such section has no bearing ()n 
procedure t() be f()lbwed on appeal when evidence is f()und 
insufficient to support finding that there was a prior e()nvicti()n. 
[7] Id.-Habitual 01fenders-Appeal-DetermiDation.-When s()Je 
question on. remand fr()m an appellatp oourt involves proof ()f 
alleged prior conviction, there is no -eason t() require parties 
to retry questi()n of guilt of primary offenses when oorrectness 
of determination of this questi()n is not challenged by either 
party, and there is nothing prejudicial inv()lved in a limited 
Dew trial ()n issue of challenged prior oonviction by a jury 
di1ferent fr()m that which tried issue of guilt of primary 
offenses, thl't issue and proof of priM conviction being clearly 
severable. 
[8: Id.-Habitual Offenders---E1fect of Proof or Adjudication.-
Pro()f of pri()r c()nvictions ()r adjudication that defendant is 
an habitual criminal does n()t involve substantive offenses, but 
merely inv()lves increased punishment of those whose pri()r 
c()nvictions fan within SC()pe of statutes, and jury d()es n()t par-
ticipate in imposition of sentence. 
(9) Id.-Habitual 01fenders---Appeal-DetermiDation.-:-An order 
setting aside a finding of trial C()urt that defendant suffered 
ehaJlenged pri()r convicti()n, and either m()difying the judgment 
by vacating the habitual criminal adjlldicati()n or remanding 
the cause f()r resentencing OD the basis of the primary offense 
and any unchallenged prior convicti()DS, would be proper where 
a new trial limited t() issue of such prior oonviction c()uld D()t 
eure defect in pr()()! becRuse ()ffense for which c()Dviction was 
suffered was not ()ne ()f thMe enumerated in Pen. C()de, § 644, 
or pri()r c()nvicti()ns were n()t alleged in information, or allega-
tion was defective, or jury did n()t make specific finding re-
quirtld by Pen. C()de, § 1158. 
[10] Id.-Habitual Oifendera - Appeal- DetermiDation.-Where 
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that defendant suffered alleged prior conviction, an order 
by court on appeal setting aside such finding but also re-
manding cause for new trial on issue of such prior conviction 
is proper, since such procedure affords defendant a fair hearing 
on charge and if it cannot be proved he will not have to suffer 
the more severe punishment. 
[11] ld.-Habitual Offenders - Appeal- Detcrmination.-Where 
defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms on four 
primary counts of which he was found guilty, but evidence 
was insufficient to support finding that defendant suffered one 
of two alleged prior convictions, it cannot be said on appeal 
that finding that defendant suffered such prior convictions 
did not influence trial court in sentencing defendant to con-
secutive rather than concurrent terms, and defendant should 
therefore be resentenced after conclusion of limited new trial 
on issue of challenged prior conviction. 
APPEAL from portion of a judgment of the Superior 
Court of Alameda County and from an order denying a new 
trial. Donald K. Quayle, Judge. Reversed with directions. 
Prosecution for burglary and attempted burglary. Part of 
judgment of conviction adjudging defendant an habitual 
criminal and imposing sentence, reversed with directions. 
George Nye, Public Defender, and Rudolf H. Michaels, 
Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and David K. Lener, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was convicted of three counts 
of burglary of the first degree and one count of attempted 
burglary of the first degree, for which he was sentenced to 
serve consecutive terms. He was also adjudged an habitual 
criminal under Penal Code, section 644(a). He appeals from 
that part of the judgment adjudging him an habitual crim·· 
inal, and from the order denying his motion for a new trial 
on the issue of the alleged second prior conviction. 
The appeal is presented by stipulation on a reporter's 
transcript limited substantially to the evidence relating to 
the alleged second prior conviction. The information alleged 
that defendant was convicted in February 1950, "of a felony, 
to wit, housebreaking and ]arceny." and had served a term in 
the Tennessee State PE'nitentiary pursuant to such conviction. 
To prove this conviction, the People introduced into evidence, 
Sept. 1953} PEOPLE tI. MORTON 
['1 C.2d 136: 261 P.2d G23J 
539 
over the objection of defendant, a fingerprint record card 
certified to be from the files of the Tennessee State Peni-
tentiary. This card contained the fingerprints of a person 
who had served a term in that penitentiary for a crime 
designated by the abbreviation "HBL." Lawrence Waldt, a 
sergeant of the sheriff's office of Alameda County, and an 
expert in fingerprint identification, testified that the finger-
prints on the card matched those of defendant taken the 
previous day. The sergeant was then asked if he was familiar 
with the" abbreviations used by criminologists and the police, 
the F .B.!., for various crimes. . . ." He replied that he was 
familiar "to some extent." To the further question whether 
he was familiar with the abbreviation "HBL" he replied: 
"The Federal Bureau of Investigation puts out a Bulletin 
of Standardized Abbreviations, and 'HB' is, as near as my 
memory stands, correct for the abbreviation for housebreaking, 
and 'L' is the desired abbreviation for larceny." On cross-
examination, Sergeant Waldt admitted that he did not know 
the elements of the offense or offenses designated by the initials 
"HBL," as those elements are defined in the laws of Ten-
nessee. This evidenee was all that was introduced by the 
People to sustain the allegation that defendant had suffered 
a second prior conviction "of a felony, to wit, housebreaking 
and larceny .... " 
[1] A sentence of life imprisonment, which follows an 
adjudication that the defendant is an habitual criminal, is 
a serious one. The People must prove the alleged prior con-
victions beyond a reasonable duubt. (See In re McVickers, 
29 Ca1.2d 264, 278 [176 P.2d 40] ; In re Lamey, 85 Cal.App. 
2d 284, 289 [193 P.2d 66] ; and cases there cited.) If the 
convictions were suffered in other states for offenses that go by 
different names from those in California, the People must 
prove that the minimum elements of the foreign offense are 
substantially similar to the minimum elements of one of the 
offenses enumerated in Penal Code,' section 644(a). (In re 
McVickers, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 264, 267; In re Wolfson, 30 Cal. 
2d 20, 23 [180 P.2d 326].) 
Defendant admits the first prior conviction alleged in the 
information. With respect to the alleged second prior con-
viction, he admits that the fingerprints on the record card 
introduced by the People are his, and that he served a term in 
the Tennessee State Penitentiary. He contends, however, that 
the evidence introduced at the trial was insufficient to prove 
) 
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a second prior conviction of one of the felonies enumerated 
in Penal Code, section 644(a). 
[2] The fingerprint record card from the Tennessee State 
Penitentiary showing defendant's imprisonment was properly 
admitted in evidence under Penal Code, section 969b.] The 
controlling question is whether that card and the testimony of 
the sergeant from the sheriff's office are sufficient to prove 
that defendant had su1fereti the alleged second prior eon-
viction. We have concluded that they are not. 
[S] Although there is DO deficiency in the type of docu-
ment introduced by the People, there is a deficiency in the 
information it contains. It does Dot show the offense for 
which defendant was convicted. It merely shows an entry 
that defendant was convicted of an offense that an official 
of the Tennessee State Penitentiary indicated by the initials 
"HBL." These initials are in no way explained by Tennessee 
authorities. The People rely, instead, on the testimony of a 
sergeant of the sheriff's office who admitted that he did not 
know the elements of the offense or offenses designated by 
the initials "HBL, "as those elements are defined in the 
laws of Tennessee. His testimony showed only that, •• as near 
as my memory stands," in the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion's "Bulletin of Standardized Abbreviations" the initials 
"HB" stand for housebreaking, and the initial "L" for 
larceny. Such a system of abbreviation might be used by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, or by the police of Cali-
fornia and other states, but proof of that fact is inapposite 
as proof of ihe meaning of these initials on the card in question 
unless it is also shown by competent evidence that this system 
of abbreviation is in use in the Tennessee State Penitentiary. 
It does not strain the imagination to identify several other 
possible charges with the initials "H,"' "B,"' and "L."2 
Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the initials 
stand for a single offense, "housebreaking with intent to 
commit larceny," as the People contend, rather than two 
or three separate offenses. [4] If the information contained 
in the records of foreign penal institutions in which a de-
·Penal Code, section 969b provides that prima facie evidence of prior 
eonvictions and imprisonment can be established by " ••• the records or 
copies of records of any state penitentiary, ..• in which BUch perBoD. has 
been imprisoned, when BUch records or copies thereof have been eerti1ied 
),y the official eUBtodian of such records. • • ." 
-E.g., habitual criminal, harboring, house of ill fame, bigamy, black-
:.mail, bookmaking, bribe17, burgla17; lewdnesa, laaeiviOUI oonduct, libel, 
Jotteq. 
) 
Sept. 1953] PEOPLE tJ. MORTON 
(41 C.2d 536; 261 P.2d 5231 
641 
fendant was imprisoned does not make clear the nature of 
his offense, it does not seem unreasonable to require the 
People to ascertain the particular statute that the defendant 
violated, or to obtain a certified copy of the judgment of con-
viction for the purpose of proving the elements of the offense 
in question. 
Since the evidence is insufficient to support the finding 
of the trial court that defendant suffered the alleged second 
prior conviction, the question arises as to the order that should 
now be made by this court. The precedents are conflicting: 
(1) In some cases the order reversed the entire judgment 
and remanded the cause for a new trial on all issues, including 
the charge of the primary offenses as well as that of the prior 
convictions. (People v. Nicholson (1939), 34 Cal.App.2d 
327 [93 P.2d 223) ; People v. RichardsOfl (1946),74 Cal.App. 
2d 528 [169 P.2d 44] ; ct. People v. Ysabel (1938), 28 Cal. 
App.2d 259, 263 [82 P.2d 476].) 
(2) In other cases, the order was similar to (1) above, but 
specified a period of time within which the district attorney 
could apply for an order dismissing the charge based on the 
challenged prior convictions. If the application were made 
'and granted, the trial court was directed to resentence the 
-defendant on the basis of the primary offenses of which he was 
found guilty and any unchallenged prior convictions. If no 
application were made, or if it were made and denied by the 
trial court, the court was directed to grant a new trial on 
all issues. (People v. Oarrow (1929), 207 Cal. 366 [278 
P. 857] ; People v. Ohadwick (1906), 4 Cal.App. 63 [87 P. 
384, 389].) 
(3) In certain cases' the order set aside the finding that 
the defendant suffered the challenged prior conviction. In 
some of these cases the judgment was modified by vacating 
the adjudication that the defendant was an habitual criminal, 
and in others the cause was remanded for resentencing on the 
basis of the primary offenses of which the defendant was 
found guilty and any unchallenged prior convictions. (People 
v. Eppinger (1895), 109 Cal. 294 [41 P. 1037]; People v. 
Murray (1940), 42 Cal.App.2d 209 [108 P.2d 748] ; People 
v. McOhesney (1940), 39 Cal.App.2d 36 [102 P.2d 455]; 
People v. Lohr (1938), 28 Cal.App.2d 397 [82 P.2d 615]; 
People v. Morrison (1938), 26 Cal.App.2d 616 [80 P.2d 
94] ; People v. Pace (1934),2 Ca1.App.2d 464 [38 P.2d 202]; 
People v. Shaw (1934), 137 Cal.App. 533 [30 P.2d 1031]; 
/ 
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People v. Arnest (1933), 133 Cal.App. 114 [23 P.2d 812] ; Peo-
ple v. Wagner (1926),78 Cal.App. 503 ~248 P. 946] ; Peopl8 
v. Foster (1934), 3 Cal.App.2d 35 [39 P.2d 271] ; People v. 
Hayes (1934),3 Cal.App.2d 59 [39 P.2d 213] ; People v. d'A 
Philippo (1934), 220 Cal. 620 [32 P.2d 962].) 
(4) In other cases the order was similar to (3) above but 
also remanded the cause for a new trial on the issue of the 
challenged prior conviction. (People v. Willison (1931), 116 
Cal.App. 157 [2 P.2d 543]; People v. Darling (1932), 120 
Cal.App.453 [7 P.2d 1094].) 
[5] Orders of types (1) and (2) above have been justified' 
on the ground that the prior conviction charged is one of the 
issues in the trial for the new offense and should be passed 
upon by the same jury that passes on the question of guilt 
of the new offense. Thus. in People v. Nicholson, supra, 34 
Cal.App.2d 327. 333, the court said: "The proving of such 
prior convictions is a statutory proceeding and since the 
amendment of section 969a of the Penal Code in 1931. there 
is no statutory authorization for passing upon the question as 
to whether such convictions have been suffered other than in 
connection with the new offense charged and by the same 
jury. (People v. Ysabel, 28 Cal.App.2d 259 f82 P.2d 4761 
[1938] .) " This reasoning is erroneous insofar as it requires 
a new trial on all issues in cases where on appeal the error 
found is confined to the prior conviction charge. The court 
in the Nicholson case adopted an argument made in People 
v. Ysabel. supra, but the latter case was not in point. The 
controlling question there was the propriety of the trial 
court's action in pronouncing judgment on the primary otl'ense 
and ordering the defendant Ysabel held for further trial on 
the prior conviction charges after discharging the jury. which 
found the defendant guilty of the primary offenses charged 
but could not agree on the prior conviction charges. Upon 
retrial, before a different judge, the court entered an order 
granting defendant Ysabel's motion to "dismiss all further 
proceedings. " The order was affirmed on appeal. The ap-
pellate court reasoned that Penal Code, section 969a. as 
amended in 1931 (Stats 1931, p. 1060), indicated a legislative 
purpose to have prior conviction charges considered only in 
8The order in People v. Chadwick, 81/pra, was given without any dis-
eussion of alternatives or citation of authorit:v. and the procedure adopted 
there was followed in People v. Carrow, 8'llpra. In People v. llicharil$o1t, 
.upra, there was no alternative to a nl'w trilll on nil iASUes sinee the re-
viewing· court found errors in the proof of the primary offenses as well 
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connection with the primary offenses charged. The 1931 
amendment to section 969a deleted a provision permitting the 
filing, at any time after judgment and before sentence had 
expired, of a supplemental indictment or information to 
charge newly discovered prior convictions. As amended, the 
statute relates only to the amendment of a pending indict-
ment or information to add ne,,, prior conviction charges 
before verdict (People v. Houston (1937), 24 Cal.App.2d 
170 [74 P.2d 517] ; People v. Louviere (1939),34 Cal.App.2d 
62 [93 P.2d 179], and all cbarges made before that time 
would of course be tried by the same jury that tried the 
primary offenses charged. [6] The legislative purpose ex-
pressed in the section, and in the 1931 amendment, was to fix a 
time after which no further charges could be made. The 
section has no bearing on the procedure to be followed on 
appeal when the evidence is found insufficient to support a 
:finding that there was a prior conviction. 
[7] When the sole question on remand from an appellate 
court involves the proof of an alleged prior conviction, there 
is no reason to require the parties to retry the question of 
guilt of the primary offenses when the correctness of the 
determination of this question is not challenged by either 
party. There is nothing prejudicial involved in a limited 
new trial on the issue of the challenged prior conviction by a 
jury different from that which tried the issue of guilt of 
the primary offenses. That issue and the proof of prior con-
victions are clearly severable. (In re McVickers, supra; In re 
Seeley, 29 Ca1.2d 294 [176 P.2d 24] ; People v. Carrow, supra.) 
[8] Proof of prior comictions or the adjudication that the 
defendant is an habitual criminal does not involve substantive 
offenses, but merely provides for increased punishment of those 
whose prior convictions fall within the scope of these statutes. 
(In re McVickers, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 264, 270-271, and refer-
ences cited there.) The important relation between the pri-
mary offenses and the prior convictions charged is, therefore, 
the sentence to be imposed, and the jury does not participate 
in that. 
[9] In most of the cases where orders of type (3) were 
given, a new trial limited to the issue of the alleged prior 
conviction could not cure the defect in proof because the 
offense for which the conviction was suffered was not one 
of those enumerated in Penal Code, section 644 (People v. 
Morrison, supra; People v. Shaw, supra; People v. Lohr, 
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People v. McOhesney, supra), or the prior convictions were 
not alleged in the information (People v. Murray, supra; 
People v. Wagner, supra) or the allegation was defective 
(People v. Arnest, supra), or the jury did not make the specific 
1lnding required by Penal Code, section 1158 (People v. Ep-
pinger, supra). In such cases an order of type (3) was 
proper. In two of these cases (People v. Hayes, supra; People 
v. Foster, sv.pra), however, it might have been possible to cure 
the defective proof on a retrial, but there was no suggestion 
of a limited new trial on the issue of the challenged prior con-
viction in either of them. 
In urging that the order should follow type (3) above, 
defendant, relying on In re McVickers, supra, and In re 
8eeley, supra, contends that had he not appealed but waited 
instead for the judgment to become final and then petitioned 
for habeas corpus, that part of the judgment adjudging him 
an habitual criminal would have been nullified and there 
would have been no new trial on the issue of the alleged second 
prior conviction, whereas if this court now orders a new 
trial on that issue he will be penalized for having appealed. 
The cases on which defendant relies do not support his con-
tention, They decided that .. a petitioner may . . . secure 
relief in habeas corpus from an erroneous adjudication of 
habitual criminal status where the facts . . . show that' as a 
matter of law the prior conviction is of a crime which does 
not meet the definition of an offense included in said section 
644." (In re 8eeley, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 294, 299.) Those cases 
did not decide that habeas corpus is available to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that a petitioner 
had suffered a prior conviction, nor did they decide that a new 
trial would be improper if a defect in proof were found that 
would be amenable to correction on retrial. 
[10] In the two cases giving orders of type (4), the de-
fects in the proof of the prior convictions were capable of 
correction on a retrial. (People v. Willison, supra; People 
v. Darling, supra.) In both cases, the appellate court re-
versed the judgment and the order denying the defendant's 
motion for a new trial insofar as they related to the chal-
lenged prior convictions. This procedure is the proper one. 
It carries out the policy of the statutes imposing "more 
illevere punishment, proportionate to their persistence in crime, 
of those who have proved immune to lesser punishment" (In 
,re.McVickers, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 264, 270), and prevents de-
. fendants from escaping the penalties imposed by those statutes 
/ 
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through technical defects in pleadings or proof. It affords the 
defendant a fair hearing on the charge,and if it cannot be 
proved he will not have to suffer the more severe punishment. 
[11] Defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms 
on the four primary counts of which he was found guilty. 
Since "it cannot be assumed that the court disregarded any 
portion of the verdict in fixing the term of imprisonment 
... " (People v. Ohadwick, supra, 4 Cal. App. 63, 74), it 
cannot be said that the finding that defendant had suffered 
two prior convictions did not influence the trial court in sen· 
tencing defendant to consecutive rather than concurrent 
terms. Defendant should, therefore, be resentenced after the 
conclusion of the limited new trial on the issue of the chal-
lenged prior conviction. 
That part of the judgment adjudging defendant an habitual 
criminal and imposing sentence and the order denying de-
fendant's motion for a new trial on the issue of the alleged 
second prior conviction are reversed, and the cause is reo 
manded to the trial court with directions to resentence de-
fendant after the conclusion of the limited new trial. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
• C.H-1I 
